

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXX No. 17

FEBRUARY 2, 1951

Senator Lodge Notes Basic Agreements on Policy

There is no doubt whatever that throughout our history free debate has added greatly to the strength of our national decisions. The public announcement that a "great debate" is to be held in the Senate instinctively seems to invite a division of everyone into two groups. Apparently one must either be a "globalist" or a "retreatist." This creates a false impression. Actually a careful reading of the Senate discussion—notably the speech of the able Senator from Ohio, Mr. Taft—shows substantial agreement on many fundamentals of future foreign policy, however much we may differ on the past. To dispel the artificial idea that we here in the Senate are more divided than is actually the case, here are some of these basic agreements:

1. We agree that constructive criticism is essential.

2. We agree that the United States made a mistake in dissipating its armed forces in 1945, in failing correctly to estimate the aims of the Soviet Union, and in secretly agreeing at Yalta to decisions from which so much tragedy has flowed.

3. We agree that we have an interest in the military strength of other nations and in their economic welfare. A revolution is underway in the world and we cannot expect less favored nations to stand still and be content with the low living standards which they have always had.

4. We agree that war is not inevitable and that it must be avoided.

5. We agree that there is a determined plan to communize the world but that there is also no cause for panic.

6. We certainly agree that we unfortunately cannot place our full reliance on

the United Nations as a practical device to protect this country from aggression. The UN charter sweepingly promises to repel aggression although there is not in existence the force which is able to do it.

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The second article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

We put the cart before the horse. We do not wish to withdraw from the United Nations and while we hope to build it up as time goes on, we must depend on our own strength and that of our partners to protect our security.

7. We agree, too, that our first consideration must be the defense of America, that America can after that be defended outside of America, but that if we undertake to respond, with military force, to every call for help we shall be bled white.

8. Equally we agree that our major effort must be through our Air Force and our Navy. It has been clear since the end of World War II that if we were to maintain a proper air force and navy, it would be far more difficult than in the past simultaneously to raise more than 35 to 40 American divisions. The World War I and II visions of a 100-division army are over. We now appreciate that if it becomes necessary, in the struggle against communism, for a major effort to be made on

land, the United States cannot possibly make it alone.

9. We also agree that a limited number of American divisions could be used in Europe as part of an Atlantic pact force with advantageous results for us—provided that our military authorities favor their use.

10. We agree with the idea expressed here in the Senate that the United States cannot abandon the rest of the world and rely solely on the defense of this continent and that we must do what we can so that Communist influence may not spread.

11. We agree that it would be obviously a colossal error to seek a decision by pitting our manpower and that of our partners against the teeming millions of Russia and China. Indeed, I know of no qualified student of the problem who wants to do this.

12. We can agree with the proposition that we should not force our decisions on nations who have no desire to arm themselves.

13. We also agree that we need a far more effective intelligence force and a great improvement in measures to help those who yearn for liberty in the satellite countries.

14. We agree that our allies should make the greatest effort of which they are capable. Their stake is as great as ours. I certainly agree with the statement, which may be more widely challenged, that the dragging of feet of the nations of Western Europe has been much exaggerated.

15. Then we can agree completely with the idea that we must have complete freedom to fight a war, if it comes, as we

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want to fight it. That goes for all the questions which war raises—Who? What? Where? When? and How?

16. Finally, there is no doubt that Congress has the right and duty to determine the size of the armed forces, increasing or reducing them as it sees fit above or below the figure desired by the Executive.

These are 16 points of substantial—though not unanimous—agreement. They seem numerous and overwhelmingly important. They do not justify the impression either here or abroad that the Senate is split right down the middle with “globalists” on the one side and “retreatists” on the other.

In all truth, there are no fundamental principles which divide us. There are questions of degree and questions of method—but nothing which really goes to the heart of the matter. The most contentious question which a reading of the record discloses is the idea that American armed forces cannot be sent overseas without consent of Congress. But this is not an

issue of principle; it is entirely an issue of degree and of method.

It is hard to understand how the members of the House and Senate, even making due allowances for their fine qualities, can possibly attempt to function as the operations section of a general staff and decide where and how and in what amount troops, ships and planes should be sent to foreign lands. Assuming that we in Congress have the ability, how can we, with all our many other duties, possibly possess professional strategic knowledge? How can we preserve the secrecy and conduct the tactics of deception and surprise which are so essential if we are to debate troop movements?

If we require congressional approval for sending troops abroad, how can the President carry out his oath of office and take the steps which are required by the Constitution to “preserve, protect and defend” the United States if a crisis should come when Congress is not in session? If we undertake to decide such questions in Congress, we shall defeat ourselves prob-

ably more quickly than an enemy could do it.

To say that we will not extend any help to the nations of Europe until they are completely strong and do not need our help is like telling a sick man that we won't give him his medicine until he has recovered. The test should not be that they are able to carry the load alone; it should be that they are making the greatest effort which they are capable of making. We must not allow ourselves to get into the state of mind of the man who is always trying to guess right and to win his bet even though he bets that disaster is going to happen. Instead of trying to guess what is going to happen, we ought to be trying to make the right thing happen.

HENRY CABOT LODGE

(This article is excerpted from a speech made in the United States Senate by Senator Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts, on January 11, 1951. Senator Lodge served as a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations during the 1950 General Assembly.)

UN Record Mirrors Fundamental Split on China

The fate of the United Nations—and indeed of the whole world—may be greatly affected by the outcome of the UN General Assembly Political Committee's search for a Korean settlement. A bloc of Asian and Arab nations, led by India, has emerged as the chief advocate of negotiation with the Chinese Communists. The United States, however, has been less than sanguine about the prospects of conciliation.

Arab-Asian Proposals

Initial consultations among 13 Asian states led to the UN's cease-fire resolution of December 14 under which a three-man committee approached Peiping with a proposal to suspend hostilities. Peiping's reply on December 22 rejected the move as a trick to gain time for “United States aggression.” Washington then began to press for a UN resolution condemning Chinese Communist aggression, but the mediation group sought further delay while it evolved a five-point plan adopted by the Political Committee on January 13. The United States—“to preserve the unity of the free world”—supported this resolution which called for 1) a cease-fire, 2) withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea, 3) Korean self-determination, 4) a UN-sponsored interim regime and 5) a group of nations—including Britain, Rus-

sia, the United States and Communist China—to discuss Korea, Formosa and China's UN representation.

On January 17 Peiping replied demanding that “all foreign troops” leave Korea; that withdrawal of American forces from Formosa be discussed by a 7-nation conference—India, Egypt and France to be added to the four proposed by the UN; that the Peiping regime be seated in the UN when the conference convened; and that the meeting be held in China.

Upon receipt of this reply through the press, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that it constituted a “complete rejection.” Next day Warren R. Austin, United States representative in the UN, advocated a new program: 1) designate Communist China an aggressor, 2) demand that Peiping recall its troops, 3) reaffirm the UN policy in Korea, 4) study action which might be taken against Peiping and 5) designate a UN group with which Peiping could negotiate.

To demonstrate American solidarity for this program, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted unanimously resolutions demanding that the UN denounce Chinese aggression and bar a seat for Peiping. India's delegate, Sir Benegal N. Rau, however, told the Political Committee on January 20 that Peiping's reply left the door open for negotiation. He op-

posed any move to condemn China on the ground that it would bar peaceful settlement and might lead to general war. The United States, nevertheless, introduced its resolution.

Meanwhile, the Indians, in reply to some questions previously submitted to Peiping, received word—transmitted to the UN by Sir Benegal on January 22—that the Communist leaders would “advise the Chinese volunteers to return to China” if the withdrawal of foreign troops was agreed to; that Peiping would discuss a cease-fire as the first item in negotiations, other questions to be considered subsequently; and that the “legitimate” status of the Peiping government in the UN “must be insured.”

The United States, although confident that it could muster an adequate majority for the passage of its resolution, was anxious to obtain support from virtually all non-Communist states in order to achieve its major objectives: to deter new Russian-sponsored adventures, to uphold the principles of collective security, to vindicate the UN and to meet the demands of American public opinion.

Compromise?

At this critical stage Britain pointed the way toward a compromise. Prime Minister Clement Attlee told Parliament on Janu-

ary 23 that London would condemn Chinese "intervention in support of an aggressor" but would continue to oppose sanctions which, it feared, might lead by ineluctable stages to a general war. Since Washington apparently had no intention of demanding immediate steps—neither a "limited war" nor a general embargo—but insisted only on the study of appropriate measures to be invoked should conciliation fail, Attlee's speech marked out the lines of possible agreement.

Meanwhile, the Asian-Arab group attempted to forestall what they considered the dangerous American move by introducing a new resolution on January 24 seeking a 7-nation preliminary conference to secure "elucidations and amplifications" of the Chinese reply and to make "incidental or consequential arrangements" for settlement of the Korean question and Far Eastern problems. India

simultaneously received new word that Peiping would participate in an exploratory conference outside of China. The representatives of Canada and Israel now sought to reconcile the Asian and American views by proposing amendments which might make them compatible.

Several new developments facilitated their efforts. On the 27th Austin indicated that the committee studying "further measures" need not report if the procedures for pacific settlement made satisfactory progress and that any proposals would require General Assembly approval. Moreover, the American resolution would not authorize the Unified Command to extend its operations in Asia. It also became clear that on the procedural question of seating Peiping in the UN, the veto could not be used.

The basic dispute, however, has scarcely been resolved by these developments. Pei-

ping's emphasis on UN recognition and the Formosan question reflect the fundamental demand of the new regime for security and status which can never be achieved so long as the Nationalists remain on Formosa and receive international recognition. Peiping's intransigence and the UN's disposition to make substantial compromises were strongest while Chinese troops were moving down the Korean peninsula at blitzkrieg tempo. Should the tide turn, as some observers are now predicting, the Chinese might become more conciliatory but the United States—as indicated by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk's radio broadcast on January 28—is reaffirming its determination to stay in Korea. Whatever resolutions are passed, it is doubtful if the underlying stalemate in the Far East can be painlessly resolved.

FRED W. RIGGS

U.S. Needs Patience in Parlous Times

The tone of discussions in Congress and the American debate about Communist China might give a visitor from Mars the impression that this country is girding for war not merely with Russia and China but also with Britain, India and other UN members which do not agree 100 per cent with the policy proposed by Washington.

The Martian onlooker might also jump to the conclusion that Congress is ready to use this country's capacity to give economic aid as a lever for forcing unwelcome decisions on our actual or potential allies—for example, by threatening to withhold further assistance to Britain unless it promptly brands Peiping an aggressor and by pigeonholing India's urgent request for 2 million tons of grain to stave off a threatened famine.

Many Contradictions

The onlooker might be puzzled, too, to find other contradictions. While General Dwight D. Eisenhower, during his intensive survey of military preparations in the North Atlantic countries, completed on January 26, was tirelessly stressing that the purpose of the Western coalition is to avert war, a few military men persisted in urging prompt use of the atomic bomb. At the same time *Life* magazine denounced President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson for failing to recognize that the United States can not co-exist with Communist Russia on the same planet and should therefore proceed to destroy the Soviet system.

This confusion of tongues—and seemingly of purposes—has caused many thoughtful Americans to wonder whether the Kremlin had somehow succeeded in hypnotizing the United States into complying with its most dire predictions. Yet, shrewd as the Soviet leaders may be—and their record is by no means free of far-reaching miscalculations—it seems irrational even to the gloomiest prophets among us to assume that Moscow can exert unchallenged remote control over Congress and the American press. The conclusion appears inescapable that if the United States is not to fulfill the long-range hopes of the Kremlin by promoting the break-up of the United Nations and the disruption of the North Atlantic coalition, we shall have to seek the remedy for the situation on our own doorstep. We shall have to stem the tide of public emotion which Walter Lippmann has described as a "panic" and find ways of action which will not give the Soviet government, by default, the ideological as well as the strategic initiative.

The fundamental difference between the United States and other non-Communist nations in the UN about China is not one of essence but of degree. Britain, Canada and France, for example, are not unwilling to recognize that Peiping has committed aggression. What they fear is that, after they join the United States in branding Peiping as an aggressor, this will not be the end but only the beginning of further developments which

might lead, against their will, to a major war in Asia. Nor can official reassurances by American UN delegate Warren R. Austin or Mr. Acheson or even President Truman alleviate their anxiety on this score. For they have seen a tendency on the part of Congress, understandably aroused by the situation in Korea, to push the Administration with practically no discussion into extreme positions—and then turn in anger on the rest of the world for not promptly acquiescing in its hastily framed demands. India and the other members of the Asian-Arab bloc in the UN have felt even more apprehensive than some of the Western nations about the possibility that designation of China as an aggressor might preclude a peaceful settlement in Asia and lead to world conflict.

Playing a Lone Hand

Last June the decision to take collective action against aggression by the North Koreans was submitted by the United States to the United Nations—although at the same time Washington acted unilaterally on the closely related question of Formosa. Since then, however, this country has increasingly tended to follow its own counsel with respect both to Korea and, after Peiping's armed intervention, to China also. As the UN members see it, decisions that may spell life and death for Europe and Asia are now reached in Washington without prior consultation of other nations' fears and wishes—and reached not by expert executive officials,

but by Congress, which then forces the hand of the executive.

It is an open question whether the Administration resents congressional assumption of leadership on foreign policy or welcomes it for the effect it may have on this country's recalcitrant partners. Whatever may be the Administration's view, our friends in the United Nations get the impression that both the President and the Secretary of State, in their efforts to escape accusations of "softness" toward Russia or China, have become prisoners of their critics. To appease these critics, a Democratic Administration finds itself driven to take positions more rigid than might be assumed by some leading Republicans. While it does not thereby succeed in placating the extremists among its opponents, it bewilders and alienates its friends at home and abroad.

For some of the difficulties thus created in the conduct of a coherent foreign policy no remedy is in sight. The mercurial quality of American public opinion, which tends to see all issues in terms of black or white and oscillates sharply between extreme pessimism and extreme optimism, is part and parcel of the national temper, and our friends will simply have to learn to take it in their stride. The activities in Washington and throughout the land of efficiently organized and well-financed lobbies advocating aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Franco and so on, in direct contravention of earlier Administration pronouncements, are a recognized feature of the American political scene, and only those who are ready to advocate totalitarian thought-control would demand their suppression.

What is urgently needed today is not a curb on opinion about foreign policy, no matter how mistaken or dangerous it may seem to those who do not share it, but an earnest attempt by Congress and by the voters to ascertain as honestly as possible the facts of whatever situation is under debate before leaping to conclusions based on emotional reaction, inadequate information or prejudice. This much our friends in the United Nations, who in case of another war would have to bear the first brunt of new destruction, have the right to ask of the most powerful nation in the world, which because of its very power

must be particularly cautious about the influence it wields.

In many important respects our debate on foreign policy accurately reflects an unresolved conflict on domestic issues. Those who hold strongly partisan views about the nature of American society in the mid-twentieth century cannot be expected to be always in agreement with each other about the conduct of relations with other nations, which are also reassessing, reorganizing or even revolutionizing their social order. It might be beneficial for us to take stock not only of our foreign policy, as Senator Robert A. Taft and others have suggested, but of the world framework within which our policy must operate. We are in such a hurry to get underway that we seem reluctant to consider where we are going and where we want to arrive. As the Chinese saying goes: "To act is easy; to know is difficult."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of two articles)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

ALBANY, February 5, *Israel and the Arab States*, Jacob C. Hurewitz

LYNN, February 5, *Crisis in the Orient*, William Henry Chamberlin

DETROIT, February 6, *Guns and Butter—Arma-ment Program*, Harlow J. Heneman

ELMIRA, February 6, *India and American Foreign Policy*, M. S. Sundaram

WORCESTER, February 6, *The United Nations in a Year of Crisis*, Raymond Dennett

ST. LOUIS, February 7, *The Role of ECA in the Present Crisis*, William C. Foster

DETROIT, February 8, *United Nations Challenge*, Lawrence Pruess

MILWAUKEE, February 9, *Will the UN Survive the Present World Crisis?*, Louis Gottschall, Chesly Manley

PHILADELPHIA, February 9, 10, Conference on Foreign Policy in Cooperation with the State Department, W. Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk

DETROIT, February 13, *Nationalism vs. Communism in Asia*, Marquis Childs

BOSTON, February 15, *Can Our Cultural Achievements Be Exported?*, Paul Chalmers, Augusta Mandosso

NEW YORK, February 15, *Britain and the Defense of the Free World*, Alistair Cooke

POUGHKEEPSIE, February 15, *Russia: An Historian's Analysis*, Hans Kohn

MILWAUKEE, February 16, *Revolution in the Far East*, Warren J. Holmes

PHILADELPHIA, February 16, Secondary School Forum

ST. LOUIS, February 16, 17, Missouri State Conference on Foreign Policy in Cooperation with the State Department

News in the Making

TITOISM IN ITALY? The prospect that Titoism may make significant inroads into the ranks of the Italian Communist party was strengthened on January 28, when two leading Communist deputies, Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi, resigned from the party. On January 19 Signor Magnani had said that the first duty of all Italians would be to defend the country if it were attacked, adding: "Russia must be regarded with sympathy by all true Marxists, but it must be considered a nation like any other."

COMMUNIST GAMBIT IN GERMANY: While East Germany has been making unification overtures to the Federal Republic at Bonn, it lost bargaining power by signing an agreement with Poland on January 27 concerning the eastern frontier question. The new pact recognizes the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent basis for the Polish-German border. While the Potsdam agreement put the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse demarcation under Polish administration, it stated that final delimitation of the frontier should await the peace settlement. West German sentiment has been nearly unanimous in condemning the loss of territory.

LAND REFORM IN IRAN: Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, known for his desire to modernize the country's economy, announced on January 28 a plan to break up his vast royal estates into small farms. The move, interpreted as the prelude to a firm government policy of land reform, may cause a serious political struggle. Wealthy landowners, who form 80 per cent of Iran's parliament, have hitherto opposed such reform.

FALL OF DUTCH CABINET: The Dutch cabinet handed its resignation to Queen Juliana on January 24 after Foreign Minister Dirk U. Stikker, repudiated by his party in Parliament, had turned in his portfolio. The immediate issue that led to the resignation was disagreement on a policy toward Western New Guinea. Since it took a month in 1948 to form the recent four-party coalition cabinet, the present crisis may be protracted.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXX, No. 17, FEBRUARY 2, 1951. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMEY, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor. The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.